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To the Editors (Ulrich Krotz and Richard Maher write):
In “Europe’s Troubles,” Sebastian Rosato argues that the high water mark of European
integration has passed and that the fate of the European Union (EU) is increasingly un-
certain.1 The European project, he claims, had a geostrategic imperative during the
Cold War: unable to match Soviet power individually, the small and medium powers of
Western Europe sought to balance the Soviet Union through economic integration. The
Soviet collapse and the end of the Cold War removed the strategic rationale for preserv-
ing the community that European governments had built over many decades. At
best, according to Rosato, Europe will continue to muddle along. At worst, the entire
European project will collapse.
Rosato’s article is an important contribution to the debate on the origins and per-
sistence of European integration. His argument that integration was motivated by
Eurasian balance of power considerations, however, leads him to make a number of
dubious theoretical and empirical claims. Theoretically, Rosato’s structural realist pre-
mises are indeterminate regarding the magnitude, scope, and direction of European in-
tegration. Empirically, Rosato is forced to overstate the scope and degree of European
integration during the Cold War and to understate the achievements and advances af-
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ter the Soviet collapse. In addition, Europe’s troubles today are not only different from
what Rosato suggests, but also more severe.
structural realism and european integration
Structural realism offers contradictory predictions and interpretations of post–Cold
War European integration—especially in security and defense affairs. Contrary to
Rosato, who predicts the EU fraying and ªssuring in the absence of the Soviet
Union,other structural realists have explained theoretically (especially as a reaction to
American unipolarity) and documented empirically how the post–Cold War political
landscape has led to greater European cooperation in security and defense, not less.2
Rosato’s exclusive focus on the balance of power largely ignores Western European
threat perceptions. Perceptions of the Soviet threat rose and fell throughout the Cold
War period. Some national leaders, such as French President Charles de Gaulle, did not
view the Soviet Union as an implacable enemy, but instead, to the consternation of
Washington, at times skillfully maneuvered between the two superpowers.
Moreover, if regional power imbalance is all that matters, one is left to wonder why
the small and medium powers of North and Central America did not take similar steps
to integrate to balance the United States. Absent any account of threat perceptions, do-
mestic politics, and the preferences, goals, and interplay of the main actors, this failure
makes little sense. Monocausal explanations such as Rosato’s have trouble explaining
events as complex and contingent as European integration over extended spans of time.
Eurasian geostrategic power considerations were at best one of several reasons that
leaders in Western Europe pursued integration in the immediate postwar period.
overstating european integration during the cold war
Rosato states that the emergence of the EU “is best understood as a response to the
postwar distribution of power” (p. 47). “Given the Soviet Union’s massive power ad-
vantage,” he writes, “the Europeans understood that they could compete effectively
only if they built a single regional economy governed by a central authority” (p. 62).
Rosato’s interpretation of European Cold War history vastly overstates the breadth and
depth of integration during this period, and misstates the main motivation behind it.
The 1951 Treaty of Paris, the ªrst step toward what is today the European Union,
formally established the European Coal and Steel Community, integrating the most
important war industries of the time. The framers of the treaty—in the words of the
1950 Schuman Declaration—were more interested in making war between France
and Germany “not merely unthinkable but materially impossible.”3 Sublimating the
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Franco-German rivalry, not balancing the Soviet Union, was the key motive behind
the early moves toward European integration following World War II.
In 1957 the “Six”—France, West Germany, Italy, and the Benelux countries—
established the rudiments of a common market, including a customs union and the re-
moval of internal barriers to trade in various economic areas. Although historically
signiªcant given Europe’s history of war and destruction, the ªrst steps toward eco-
nomic integration remained limited in scope: in addition to removing certain tariffs
and trade quotas, they included a wide scheme of agricultural subsidies as part of the
Common Agricultural Policy (CAP).
These measures, however, fell far short of full-scale economic integration, particu-
larly compared to the level of integration achieved in the post–Cold War period.
European economic integration certainly was not “governed by a central authority.” In-
stead, European governments integrated certain sectors of their economies. Other eco-
nomic areas, especially the most costly ones or those closely linked to state sovereignty,
remained at the national level: taxation and ªscal policy, everything related to the wel-
fare state, and monetary policy. The EU budget was limited to little more than 1 percent
of its members’ combined gross domestic product, and the biggest portion of this by far
went to farm subsidies via CAP. Balancing the Soviet Union with coal, common mar-
ket regulations, and cows? None of these constitute a serious attempt at matching
Soviet power. Irrespective of whether a single market would have helped to balance
the Soviet Union or not, the Single European Act (SEA) was signed only in 1986, the
Cold War’s twilight.
Integration in the domains that would have been most able to shape a Western
European counterweight to the Soviet Union—foreign policy, security, and defense—
Rosato instantly has to explain away, because integration in these areas remained feeble
or entirely absent throughout the Cold War. After the European Defense Community
had failed decisively in 1954, NATO became the supreme security institution for
Western Europe, with the Western European Union no more than a token organization.
Rosato also ignores the EU’s many political and institutional crises during the Cold
War period. There was a lack of political will to create a fully uniªed political entity.
President de Gaulle decisively put an end to federalism (or, as Jean Monnet referred to
it, “supranationalism”). From the Luxembourg crisis of 1966 to the mid-1980s, when the
SEA was signed, the EU experienced a period of inertia and stagnation, which observ-
ers at times derisively referred to as “Eurostasis” or “Eurosclerosis.”
understating european integration after the cold war
With the Soviet Union gone, Rosato sees the key motivating force behind the European
project removed: “[T]he demise of the Soviet Union has deprived [Europeans] of a com-
pelling geostrategic reason to pursue political or military integration or to preserve the
integrated economy they built between 1950 and 1990” (p. 68). This claim forces Rosato
to downplay the substantial advances in European integration since the end of the Cold
War.
Contrary to Rosato’s analysis, not only did the EU survive the Soviet Union’s col-
lapse, but it reached new heights in the ªrst two decades of the post–Cold War period.
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It embarked on a period of greater integration and signiªcantly expanded its member-
ship (“deepening” and “widening” in the Euro-lexicon). The 1991 Maastricht treaty
formally gave birth to European Monetary Union (EMU) and the creation of the
European Central Bank (ECB) as well as a unitary currency, the euro. This marked an
enormous pooling of sovereignty, yet had little to do with balancing the tottering Soviet
Union.
For the sake of his argument, Rosato makes monetary union and the arrival of the
euro a Cold War legacy that carried over into the post–Cold War era. “Like the euro,”
he says, “the ECB involved the evolution of an existing system, not a fundamental
change of it” (p. 68). He is correct that plans for monetary union date back at least to the
1980s, and that German Chancellor Helmut Kohl and French President François
Mitterrand had discussed the project. It was German uniªcation, however—codeªning
the Cold War’s conclusion—that decisively sped up the execution of plans for mone-
tary union.4 In other words, the end of the Cold War and the prospect of German unity
decisively accelerated adoption of EMU, thus causing deepened integration—exactly
the opposite of what Rosato suggests.
European countries have also made strides toward greater foreign policy and secu-
rity cooperation since the end of the Cold War.5 Rosato overlooks this record because he
adopts the straw man of formal political and military union—an unrealistic ambition
that exceeds that of all but the most ardent federalists. European governments have
sought a common foreign and security policy, not a single one. Political and military
union has not emerged, nor is it on the horizon. As such, nothing is new. Nor is it clear
why the appropriate benchmark should be full political and military integration when
judging the success or failure of the EU in the post–Cold War period. If one drops
Rosato’s idealistic criterion, the achievements are many and the overall record looks
quite different.
europe’s real troubles today
Europe today is in crisis, its future uncertain. It is not even one crisis but rather a con-
ºuence of several crises that strike at the core of the European project. The current
eurozone crisis is a sovereign debt crisis as well as a competitiveness crisis of the econo-
mies at Europe’s periphery. It also is a crisis of institutional design, as the euro chains
together economies with radically different performance levels, capital needs, and ªscal
capacities, while abolishing their ability to conduct national monetary policy.
The European malaise is compounded by the long-term rise of diverse kinds of anti-
Brussels sentiment: views that the EU scheme had become too economically liberal
(from the left); too centralizing and bureaucratic (center-right); too aggressively under-
mining of national sovereignty and responsibility (right); and generally too intrusive,
expansionist, and fraught with democratic legitimacy deªcits (across the spectrum).
Some further stress the community deªcit crisis, the weakness or absence of true “we-
Correspondence: Debating European Integration 181
4. This is not to argue that monetary union was simply the price Germany had to pay for the ac-
quiescence of other EU member states to uniªcation. Some still purport this interpretation, which
is historically and chronologically inaccurate.
5. Posen, “European Union Security and Defense Policy”; Jones, The Rise of European Security Coop-
eration; and Ulrich Krotz and Richard Maher, “International Relations Theory and the Rise of Euro-
pean Foreign and Security Policy,” World Politics, Vol. 63, No. 3 (July 2011), pp. 548–579.
feeling” among the EU’s 500 million citizens. In these times of integration fatigue,
moreover, no unifying purpose or vision convinces, unites, or inspires Europeans to
support the European project in ways comparable to the enthusiasm that the ideal of
“no more war” generated following World War II.
Europe’s problems are not only different from what Rosato suggests, but also more
numerous, complex, and severe. The Soviet Union’s collapse and the associated power
shift in Eurasia explains little or nothing of the EU’s current calamities and challenges—
and bears not at all on their future escalations or resolutions. The European project’s
troubles, in brief, would be much less grave, and the EU and the state of European inte-
gration would be much better off, if the disappearance of the Soviet Union actually
were its main problem.
—Ulrich Krotz
Cambridge, Massachusetts
—Richard Maher
Florence, Italy
To the Editors (David M. McCourt and Andrew Glencross write):
Sebastian Rosato’s article “Europe’s Troubles” is an important contribution to the de-
bate on the European Union’s (EU’s) origins, history, and prospects.1 Rosato should be
praised, in particular, for putting forward a speciªcally power political explanation for
the EU’s development. Nonetheless, Rosato overstates the power of his theory against
its principal competitors and lays out an overly restrictive view of integration history.
Equating power politics with balancing alone neglects attempts by Britain and France
since 1945 to continue to manage the international system—as great powers do. Looking
beyond balancing, a “great power management” perspective offers starkly different,
less pessimistic, conclusions regarding the future of Europe.
the limits of a balance of power analysis of the eu
Rosato claims that it was the extraordinary disparity in power on the continent after
1945 that drove the Western Europeans to “integrat[e] their economies” in the 1950s
(p. 59). There are two problems with this premise. First, the Europeans did not fully in-
tegrate their economies. A “single market” was not the automatic product of the 1957
Rome treaty that launched the European Economic Community; market integration re-
mains far from complete, as attempts to integrate defense procurement demonstrate.2
The 1950s instead saw the creation of supranational institutions designed to pressure
national leaders into maintaining their treaty commitment to an ever closer union.
Rosato’s argument that cooperation became integration to overcome a three to one
power deªcit overlooks the manifold struggles of the European Court of Justice and the
European Commission to overcome national sovereignty, making it misleading to de-
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clare that by the late 1950s “balance of power calculations had pushed the Europeans to
establish an integrated economy” capable of facing down the Soviet threat (p. 62).
Second, not all West European states were involved in integrating their economies
during the early 1950s, even in this limited way. Britain, notably, initially refused to join
the European project, acceding only in 1973 after French President Charles de Gaulle
vetoed two previous attempts.3 Rosato does not address the British case, because it con-
tradicts his central argument. Unless the stopping power of the English Channel was a
reason to ignore Britain, either London was still a signiªcant power—in which case
a balancing coalition against the Soviet Union should have centered around it—or, as a
non-great power similar to other European states, Britain should have joined its neigh-
bors in their endeavors. Neither of these scenarios occurred, as Britain decided against
integration.
British leaders made this choice because the Soviet threat was only one aspect of a
complex postwar situation that led some West European nations but not others to
choose integration. Consider the commonly accepted account of the creation of the
European Coal and Steel Community that its aim was to bind German power by re-
moving control of raw materials while facilitating French recovery. Although Rosato is
correct that many French and German industrialists were against the plan (p. 79), a bal-
ancing explanation is only partial, because the plan was explicitly about limiting
Germany’s capacity to rebuild its economy independent of supranational constraint.4 If
balancing is involved, therefore, it is a curious form of balancing-Germany-through-
integration by France. In fact, this form of balancing characterizes the Maastricht treaty
of 1991, in which a newly reuniªed Germany was tightly bound to the EU to allay fears
over an independent German foreign policy. Although Rosato argues that this took
place before the collapse of the Soviet Union, and was explicable in terms of balancing,
Maastricht was agreed after the end of the Cold War when the Soviet threat had disap-
peared, which cannot thereby be considered the main motivating factor.
great power management and the origins of europe
If balancing was not the only reason for “the Six” to integrate, without Britain, how else
might one understand the power political origins of the EU? We suggest that the notion
of “great power management” (GPM) is useful. Classic balance of power theorists
Kenneth Waltz and Hedley Bull both stress that balancing is only one way in which
great powers play the time-old game of power politics: driven by their relative size, ca-
pabilities, and histories, they are also driven to manage the international system.5 They
do so by ªrst maintaining a stable general balance of power internationally; second, by
managing their relations with other great powers and preventing crises; third, by creat-
ing regional spheres of interest; and ªnally, by controlling their inferiors within those
spheres.6 Balancing is then only one of the power political drivers of international af-
fairs, as the EU demonstrates.
Britain’s refusal to enter the EU is explicable from a GPM perspective because, al-
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though exhausted, its leaders still believed Britain to be a great power in the period,
and other powers treated it as such. As Foreign Secretary Ernest Bevin told the House
of Commons in 1947, “His Majesty’s Government does not accept the view . . . that we
have ceased to be a great power.” Britain did not need to integrate, therefore, because it
was a great power doing what great powers do. This included maintaining the general
balance of power internationally by playing a crucial role in gaining U.S. security guar-
antees for Western Europe, requesting ªnancial assistance leading to the Marshall Plan,
and transferring the ªnancing of Greece and Turkey to Washington in 1947. This great
power mind-set changed only after the Suez crisis in 1956 conªrmed Britain’s depend-
ence on the United States, closely followed by an ignominious withdrawal from “East
of Suez.” At this point, British leaders began to appreciate that Britain’s ability to retain
a GPM role could only come through European integration.
By that time, however, a change had taken place in Paris that would prevent British
membership to the EU for more than a decade. Again, France’s actions over integration
are more explicable in terms of GPM than straight balancing against the Soviets. As
Alan Milward has argued, the integration process was not about transcending the
nation-state, but about preserving it,7 particularly for France, which had lost its great
power status following German occupation. The notion of Europe as a “third force,”
drawn upon extensively by Rosato (e.g., pp. 57, 60), was aimed not solely at the Soviets,
but also at the emerging bipolar order, with its negative portents for France and French
culture worldwide. By the time Britain ªrst applied for membership in 1961, de Gaulle
was in power and was convinced of the need to reassert France’s great power status
through an independent—non-Anglo-Saxon—foreign policy. For him, Britain was a
“Trojan horse” for Washington; only after he had left ofªce would France allow Britain
to join the EU.
From a German perspective, the initial phase of European integration was an instru-
mental precondition for reestablishing full sovereignty for the Federal Democratic
Republic. Only through such self-binding could West Germany hope to normalize its
postwar international relations, which was necessary to retain the possibility of inºu-
encing decisions over the future of Soviet-controlled East Germany. Indeed, German
leaders were prepared to cement economic and political ties even further, through the
Maastricht treaty establishing the euro and a common foreign policy, in return for
Britain, France, Russia, and the United States acquiescing to reuniªcation. Postreuni-
ªcation, Germany has been active in the development of an EU foreign policy: a means
of further “normalizing” its international relations. The common strand, therefore,
is the desire to manage Germany’s international engagements through supranational
integration.
predicting the future
In addition to providing an important corrective to Rosato’s historical account, this
wider power political explanation of integration leads to different conclusions regard-
ing “Europe’s troubles.” The EU has always been a vehicle for the projection of the
power of its principal member states. Where Rosato sees the likely dissolution of
Europe, therefore, a GPM perspective expects the Union’s salience to depend on its use-
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fulness for the former European great powers going forward. On trade and environ-
mental governance, in particular, the EU is a force multiplier. Yet as the uncoordinated
response to the Libya crisis demonstrates, a common foreign policy is dependent on the
larger European countries’ ability to bring signiªcant assets to the table as well as ªnd
shared ground. This will prove difªcult as military budgets decline, and might explain
the recent Anglo-French defense pact, signed in November 2010: a bilateral mechanism
for pooling capacities that could also be used to support EU actions. In short, in areas of
high politics, the EU retains a “capabilities-expectations gap” as well as a “consensus-
expectations gap”8 that postdate the collapse of the Soviet Union.
Nonetheless, Europe’s negotiation of a cease-ªre between Russia and Georgia in 2008
proves that great power management is not beyond the large European states. What
matters for Europe’s future is how much consensus there is between them on using the
EU for great power management, and hence what kinds of concrete beneªts they think
they can derive from it. This modiªed power political line of argumentation may well
help provide an answer to the conundrum Rosato’s work poses about the incentive
states have to preserve the EU in the post–Cold War era. The Soviet threat may be gone,
but the large European states retain too great a stake in the international system to re-
fuse a role in managing it, and the EU remains their best vehicle for doing so. Contra
Rosato, European integration will thus matter to them more rather than less—unless
great power management is left to the Americans and emerging powers. Europe could
well opt for the latter, but as the result of the politics of GPM, not the absence of an ex-
ternal threat.
—David M. McCourt
Berkeley, California
—Andrew Glencross
Aberdeen, Scotland
To the Editors (Norrin M. Ripsman writes):
Sebastian Rosato’s article on the origins of the European Union makes a number of im-
portant observations about the reasons why the weakened states of Europe pursued
their ambitious project of economic and, to a lesser extent, political integration after
World War II.1 He is correct to point out that integration and security cooperation rep-
resented a logical choice for countries under threat from a Soviet Union with an
overwhelming conventional forces advantage on the continent. Nonetheless, he under-
estimates the importance of the United States in making European cooperation pos-
sible. Moreover, he does not consider that, after the founding realist impetuses for
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cooperation—the Soviet threat and active U.S. participation in the region—abated, co-
operation intensiªed among the states of the region. Consequently, he underestimates
the role that liberal factors, such as the democratization of West Germany and coopera-
tive European institutions, had in transforming the nature of European international re-
lations.2 I illustrate these arguments with reference to the crucial Franco-German dyad
that formed the cornerstone of both West European antagonism before 1945 and re-
gional stability after World War II.
There is no question that the Soviet threat served as the catalyst for European secu-
rity cooperation after World War II. Although the French public and its leaders still
feared Germany, which had conducted offensive operations on French soil three times
in seventy-ªve years, French military and political leaders recognized as early as
1948 that the Soviet Union posed a more immediate and formidable threat. They
judged that, divided and occupied, Germany represented only a medium- to long-term
threat, while the Soviet conventional force imbalance that Rosato identiªes posed a far
more serious threat to France in the short term.3
Nonetheless, until the United States and, to a lesser extent, Great Britain provided
extensive security guarantees and committed their troops to the continent on a perma-
nent basis, the French political leadership was unwilling to allow the German rearm-
ament that French military leaders believed was essential to counter the Soviet threat.
Consequently, France delayed an agreement on German rearmament and security co-
operation until the autumn of 1954, more than six years after its military leaders judged
it to be a critical necessity, until it secured a meaningful U.S. commitment.4 Although it
is clear, as Rosato notes, that residual fears of American abandonment lingered, U.S. in-
stigation, incentives, and long-term participation in the European defense framework
served as the glue that made effective European security cooperation against the Soviet
Union possible.
If power political factors brought about security cooperation and the economic and
political integration that characterized the European Community, however, they cannot
be credited with its deepening. After all, the Soviet threat to Western Europe declined
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considerably after the mid-1950s, yet European cooperation intensiªed, with security
cooperation engendering economic cooperation and eventually broader political inte-
gration. Moreover, as I indicate below, European institutions brought about changing
societal attitudes in Europe, which is another aspect of deepening cooperation. The
intensiªcation of European cooperation in the face of détente and the reduced threat
perception during Mikhail Gorbachev’s presidency belie the insufªciency of power pol-
itics as an explanation for European cooperation.
Rosato attempts to skirt this problem by evaluating threat levels based merely on the
relative conventional power tables of the Soviet Union versus the six original European
powers (p. 65). This is misleading for three reasons. First, his evaluation does not factor
in the signiªcant contributions of Britain and the United States, which would alter rela-
tive power ratios considerably in Europe’s favor. Second, it downplays the importance
of U.S. extended nuclear deterrence, as well as the British and French nuclear forces,
which diminished the utility and value of Soviet conventional forces. Finally, it ignores
the degree of threat perception, which was signiªcantly reduced under détente and
during Gorbachev’s leadership. Therefore, maintaining that the Soviet threat to Europe
was constant from 1950 to 1990 is highly inaccurate.
More strikingly, the ability of European cooperation to endure and even deepen after
the collapse of the Soviet Union, rather than descend into the kind of competition and
conºict that John Mearsheimer predicted, presents a considerable puzzle for Rosato’s
thesis that the European project was and is merely a reºection of power politics.5 Nor
can deepening cooperation be pinned solely on U.S. hegemonic engagement on the
continent, after the rebuilding of the European conventional forces, the development of
British and French nuclear forces, and U.S. pressure for burden sharing decreased the
relative level of U.S. participation in Europe, especially after the Soviet threat retreated.
If power politics cannot explain the deepening of Europe, what can? As I argue else-
where, whereas European security cooperation initially was merely a statist bargain
among West European states and the United States, with no societal buy-in, by the late
1980s regional democratization, the creation of European political and economic insti-
tutions, and, to a lesser extent, economic integration brought European societies on
board, ultimately transforming regional relations.6 Witness, for example, the dramatic
transformation of French public opinion toward Germany. While security cooperation
was initially being negotiated in the early 1950s, the majority of the French public
(55 percent of decided respondents) believed that France should not have even “cor-
dial” relations with the Federal Republic of Germany (FRG).7 On the eve of the 1954
agreements paving the way for German rearmament and NATO entry, the vast majority
of the French public (66 percent of decided respondents) feared German rearmament in
any form, while an additional 28 percent believed that it could be benign only with ade-
quate safeguards.8 Shortly after these agreements, in 1956, almost three in four French-
men surveyed reported a negative opinion of the FRG. Yet by 1964, a large majority of
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respondents reported a positive opinion of the FRG (58 percent compared with only
11 percent reporting a negative opinion).9 By 1972, attitudes had further improved, with
more than 85 percent of decided French respondents opining that Germany no longer
represented a threat to France.10 As a result, when the issue of German reuniªcation
was broached in the autumn of 1989, a public opinion poll indicated that 80 percent of
Frenchmen favored German uniªcation within the conªnes of European institutions.11
Clearly, societal attitudes had altered since the security arrangements of 1954. Coopera-
tion was no longer simply dictated by realist, balance of power considerations; it was
now more ªrmly grounded at the societal level.
Furthermore, Rosato overstates the importance of the Soviet threat in bringing about
economic integration in Europe. A key factor motivating Jean Monnet and Robert
Schuman to propose the creation of the European Coal and Steel Community and, sub-
sequently, the Treaty of Rome was the fear that the German economic recovery that
Washington was pushing (through the elimination of industrial restrictions and the
scale-back of the industrial dismantling program) would eventually allow Germany
to threaten France again in the future.12 Consequently, they conceived a plan to inte-
grate the German economy within a broader European framework to minimize the fu-
ture threat. Of course, this is indirectly attributable to the Soviet threat, given that the
United States was eager to restore the German economy as part of a broader plan to
contain the spread of communism. Nonetheless, this is hardly the direct causal path
that Rosato asserts, which oversimpliªes the history of European integration.
Finally, the crises in contemporary Europe that Rosato identiªes, though not trivial,
belie the extent to which Europe still remains closer to what Emanuel Adler and
Michael Barnet call a “pluralistic security community” rather than a region of competi-
tion and war.13 After all, although economic integration has been shaken by the recent
global economic crisis, and although the prospect of a common European Union for-
eign and security policy remains a chimera, the prospects of war between EU members
in the foreseeable future are virtually zero. As Benjamin Miller puts it, war between re-
gional participants is “unthinkable,” if not impossible.14 Thus, Rosato overstates the de-
gree of disintegration in Europe and the extent to which the demise of the common
Soviet threat has led to the return of politics as usual in Europe.
Overall, Rosato’s argument is overstated and ignores the qualitative changes in inter-
European relations in the last ªfty years. A more careful analysis would lead one to be-
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lieve that power politics is not the only force driving contemporary European security
cooperation.
—Norrin M. Ripsman
Montreal, Canada
To the Editors (Mark S. Sheetz and Jean-Yves Haine write):
Standard realist explanations of European integration took a beating after the Cold
War.1 They could not explain why (1) the European security community did not col-
lapse or (2) why integration intensiªed after the end of the Soviet threat with the
Maastricht treaty, the European Union (EU), and a common currency. Sebastian Rosato
presents a classic realist argument, but he attempts to revive the basic realist case by
ªnessing these questions.2 He conveniently ignores the successes and instead focuses
on the failures, portraying a community that has all but collapsed and a European
Union that has stalled.
The failures, such as the French, Dutch, and Irish rejection of the European constitu-
tion, a potential unraveling of the Schengen accord, and the Greek debt crisis, do indi-
cate that a realist explanation has merit. Indeed, Rosato’s focus on balance of power
theory as an explanation for European integration is a much needed corrective to alter-
native explanations that employ liberal institutional theory, democratic peace theory, or
constructivist theory. His contribution is a welcome reminder that European states re-
main sensitive to power considerations and that, then as now, the European project is
best understood through the prism of power politics. Rosato’s narrative, however, suf-
fers from three major ºaws.
three problems
The ªrst problem is Rosato’s claim that Europeans responded to a security threat not by
means of political or military integration, but by economic integration. If Europeans
were faced with a compelling security threat and had to balance against the Soviet
Union (pp. 47, 59, 85), why did they seek only economic cooperation in the European
Economic Community (EEC)? Why did the negotiations to establish a European com-
mon market start in 1955, not in 1948, when perception of the Soviet threat among
European countries was at its peak? Why did Europeans create a monetary union and a
common security and defense policy only after the Soviet threat had disappeared? This
is not what realist theory predicts.
The second problem is that Rosato bases his argument on the distribution of power.
According to his logic, the distribution of power—the alleged explanatory variable—
does not explain European integration. When faced with an existential threat during
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the Cold War, Europeans did not seek political or military cooperation (pp. 68–69, 70–
71). When the distribution of power changes and the threat disappears after the Cold
War, Europeans no longer have an incentive to seek political or military integration
(pp. 47, 68, 84). So according to Rosato’s argument, no matter what the distribution of
power is, Europeans have no incentive to seek political and military integration. This
means that the independent variable changes—threat/no threat—but the dependent
variable (integration) does not. Moreover, European integration advances in ªts and
starts. It varies, yet the Soviet threat remains constant. Again, the correlation between
independent and dependent variable is missing.
If anything, the Maastricht treaty and the euro demonstrate a move toward even
greater integration after the Cold War. If Europeans could not integrate politically or
militarily in the presence of the Soviet threat, then why would integration advance in
the absence of that threat? If the demise of the Soviet Union deprived Europeans of a
compelling reason to pursue integration (p. 68), then why did they seek greater integra-
tion at Maastricht with the creation of the European Union after the Soviet collapse
and a change in the distribution of power? This was the most signiªcant push for in-
tegration since 1957. The explanation given by Rosato for this seeming theoretical
anomaly—path dependence—is unconvincing (p. 73). It appears to be an attempt to ex-
plain away inconvenient anomalies with auxiliary hypotheses.3
The third problem is that, while taking account of the global balance of power,
Rosato fails to consider the balance of power within Europe. The intra-European bal-
ance of power dynamic offers a much better tool to explain the rise of the EEC, the at-
tempt to contain German power at Maastricht, and the current crisis of the eurozone.
Realists have emphasized the role of relative gains as an obstacle to cooperation. The
relative gains issue was a crucial dimension of the European integration process dur-
ing and after the Cold War. In other words, the internal balance of power dynamics is
crucially missing in Rosato’s account of European integration. That states should be
concerned by the respective power of their neighbors as much, if not more than, the
global distribution of power should come as no surprise for realists. Two episodes illus-
trate this dynamic, the failure of the European Defense Community (EDC) and the
Maastricht treaty.
the european defense community
When U.S. Secretary of State Dean Acheson told the NATO allies in September 1950
that a German contribution to the defense of Europe was necessary, the prospect came
as a shock to French politicians and public alike. In October 1950, only ªve years after
the end of World War II, some 51 percent of Frenchmen were against the inclusion of
German units into a European army, with a mere 21 percent in favor.4 The French fear
of the Soviet threat did not imply support for a German army. The EDC saga, from the
Pleven Plan in October 1950 until its demise by a vote of the French national assembly
in August 1954, illustrates the prevalence of relative gains logic among Europeans, es-
pecially when the role of the United States was still uncertain.
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A strictly European solution to the conundrum of relative gains between France and
Germany was illusory for two reasons. First, a defense community limited to Europe
was not enough to balance the Soviet Union. Contrary to Rosato’s argument, a military
coalition of the original six founders of the EU could not have balanced the Soviet
Union in any meaningful way. Second, the very success of the EDC could have trig-
gered what Europeans, including the French and Germans, feared the most: an early
departure of the United States. Indeed, as Rosato rightly points out, the U.S. commit-
ment to European security during the early 1950s seemed hesitant, minimal, and
temporary.
The NATO minimal commitment signed in April 1949 seemed for some Americans
already exorbitant.5 For President Dwight Eisenhower, U.S. troops could be withdrawn
within four to eight years, and even NATO would not be needed “for longer than ten to
twenty years.”6 Washington underestimated, however, the prevalence of the relative
gains conundrum for France. The process of the EDC increased the French perception
that the United States was about to leave. For Paris, a successful EDC could have ulti-
mately left France with actual German rearmament, an enduring Soviet threat, and a
U.S. withdrawal.
the maastricht treaty
The second episode involves the Maastricht treaty and the deepening of European inte-
gration after the Cold War. For Rosato, “The collapse of the Soviet Union has meant
that the Europeans no longer need to consider integration” (p. 69). And yet, as
the Maastricht treaty illustrates, Europeans chose to deepen their cooperation when the
Soviet threat disappeared. Rosato introduces an economic argument to justify this
development. This again overlooks the internal balance of power dynamics among
Europeans and their attempts to overcome the new European balance triggered by the
reuniªcation of Germany. It was a change in the European balance, not the global distri-
bution of power, that triggered the relaunching of European integration in 1991.
Paris considered the uniªcation of Germany as the reopening of the Yalta settle-
ment.7 For France, the prospect of a united Germany was deeply unsettling, recalling
François Mauriac’s remark that “I love Germany so much I am glad there are two of
them.” Yet, the attempted solution to manage the new European balance was to further
integrate Europe. Rosato argues that “Europe kept moving toward monetary union de-
spite the end of the Cold War because of prosperous economic conditions” (p. 73), but
the main impetus behind the euro was the reuniªcation of Germany.
The EDC failure and the Maastricht treaty illustrate that the logic of relative gains
was and is a permanent concern for states creating and managing institutions. During
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and after the Cold War, this realist constraint of relative power remains the most rele-
vant variable to understand the evolution of European integration.
a different realism
To the chagrin of standard realist theory, the Soviet threat was not so compelling as to
suppress relative gains among European states. Europeans were sensitive to relative
gains; and relations among France, Germany, and Britain in particular were driven by
such considerations. That is why France opposed postwar German reconstruction in all
its aspects, whether economic, political, or military.8 It is why France rejected German
entry into NATO in September 1950 and, when German rearmament could no longer be
avoided, why France made the decision to build an atomic bomb in December 1954.9 It
is why the smaller powers rejected the Fouchet Plan in April 1962, why France vetoed
British entry into the Common Market in January 1963, and why everyone rejected a
nuclear-armed Germany.
There is a realist theory that explains European integration during the Cold War and
the persistence of the European Union thereafter. It has to do with sovereignty and au-
tonomy, and with the fear of becoming a Soviet satellite or a U.S. protectorate.10 The
EU can survive after the collapse of the Soviet threat because, individually, European
states do not rise to the level of great powers and lack inºuence in global politics.
EU states are no longer great powers individually, but together they may be able to act
like one.
—Mark S. Sheetz
Cambridge, Massachusetts
—Jean-Yves Haine
Toronto, Canada
Sebastian Rosato Replies:
I appreciate the opportunity to respond to the thoughtful critiques of my recent article
“Europe’s Troubles.”1 I begin with a restatement of my core argument and then address
the three most important issues raised by my critics.
europe’s troubles
The questions I pose are straightforward: Why has the European integration project run
into trouble? And where is it headed? To answer these questions, one needs a theory of
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institutions that can account for a number of developments. First, it must explain why
the Europeans formed an economic community—the European Community (EC)—
in the 1950s. This task is fundamental because the EC is an exceptional institution, one
that involves integration rather than cooperation. The Europeans did not simply agree
to coordinate their efforts when they established the Community; they also gave up
part of their sovereignty—the right to make policy autonomously—to a central actor.
Second, the theory must account for the Europeans’ maintenance of the EC from 1960 to
1990. Third, it must shed light on developments since the end of the Cold War; spe-
ciªcally, it must explain why the economic community endured through the 1990s,
but has been fraying over the past decade. Finally, the theory must explain why the
Europeans have preferred to engage in political and military cooperation rather than
integration since World War II.
My theory holds that institutions largely reºect the balance of power. States confront-
ing a powerful adversary can cooperate or integrate. Usually they cooperate, but if
their adversary is especially powerful, they seek to organize their balancing coalition as
efªciently as possible and consider integration. Once they have decided whether to co-
operate or integrate, they establish institutions to ensure that their joint endeavors run
as smoothly as possible. It follows that as long as the distribution of power that gener-
ated a particular set of institutions endures, so, too, do those institutions. Likewise, it
takes an alteration in the power architecture that gave rise to a set of institutions for
them to change in a meaningful way.
The integration project can be understood as a response to the European balance of
power. Consider developments in the 1950s: the Europeans confronted a formidable
threat in the shape of the Soviet Union and feared that the United States would eventu-
ally withdraw from the continent. Therefore, they established the EC. Their thinking
went as follows: because economic power was the basis of military might, they had to
build an economic coalition; and because the Soviet Union was so powerful, the coali-
tion had to take the form of a single regionwide economy governed by a central author-
ity. Similar thinking prompted them to consider building an integrated military as well.
Ultimately, however, they chose to retain their military sovereignty and wait to form a
military community in the event the United States actually withdrew its forces and left
them to contain the Soviet Union on their own.
Because there were no major changes in the European power architecture from 1960
to 1990, the Europeans did not alter the arrangements of the 1950s in meaningful ways.
They did not take real steps toward political or military integration, and although the
EC evolved considerably, it was not fundamentally transformed.
The collapse of the Soviet Union radically altered the balance of power. Since 1991,
the countries of Europe have not confronted an existential threat, a fact that has had
profound implications for the European project. It has meant that the Europeans have
not attempted political or military integration. At the same time, it has meant that they
no longer have a compelling reason to preserve their economic community. The effects
of this structural change did not manifest themselves in the 1990s because these were
years of great prosperity, but the economic situation has worsened since the turn of the
century and, predictably, the EC has begun to show unmistakable signs of strain.
What does this mean for the future? As long as there are no further changes in the
balance of power, the Europeans will not take signiªcant steps toward political or mili-
tary integration. They will also continue to have no compelling reason to preserve their
economic community. As a result, further economic crises are likely to lead to more
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fraying of the Community. At best, the economic situation will improve, and the EC
will continue to muddle along.
the role of soviet power
My critics argue that a close look at developments in Europe since 1945 shows that
European integration cannot be understood as an attempt to balance against Soviet
power. I address their criticisms in chronological order.
David McCourt and Andrew Glencross assert that European integration cannot have
originated as a response to Soviet power because the Europeans did not integrate their
economies fully in the 1950s. If the Soviet threat was so compelling, they argue, then
surely the Europeans should have gone further. As Ulrich Krotz and Richard Maher
put it, the European Coal and Steel Community (ECSC) and the European Economic
Community (EEC) did not “constitute a serious attempt at matching Soviet power.”
I agree that the Europeans did not achieve full economic integration in the 1950s.
Nevertheless, their fear of the Soviet Union had two important effects: it caused them to
take the unprecedented decision to integrate their economies; and it led them to build
unique institutions designed to facilitate integration. Moreover, although they did not
achieve full integration, the Europeans went a long way toward creating an integrated
economy that would enable them to balance the economic power of the Soviet
Union. Take, for example, Krotz and Maher’s observation that the ECSC integrated
“the most important war industries of the time.” In addition, the EEC agreement estab-
lished a “common market,” thereby enabling the Europeans to beneªt from the econo-
mies of scale and technological innovations that go with large markets. The European
Monetary Agreement, a ªxed exchange rate system that was functionally equivalent to
a common currency, buttressed both arrangements.
McCourt and Glencross also suggest that Britain’s refusal to join the EC in the 1950s
is a problem for my argument. If fear of the Soviet Union was the driving force behind
the EC, then Britain should have joined because the six founding members—France,
Germany, Italy, and the Benelux countries—did not have enough economic power to
balance against Moscow effectively. This is an important point that I deal with else-
where and should have addressed in my article.2 A simple balance of power argument
explains Britain’s refusal to join: the six continental states could balance against the
Soviets without British help, and therefore Britain was free to pursue a buck-passing
strategy toward the continent. From 1950 to 1960, the combined economic power of
the Six was roughly equal to that of the Soviet Union (p. 55). As a result, Britain, which
was less endangered than its European allies because it was separated from the conti-
nent by the English Channel, buck-passed the balancing burden—a burden that in-
volved integration and therefore an unacceptable surrender of sovereignty—to the Six.
Mark Sheetz and Jean-Yves Haine claim that balance of power calculations cannot
explain the timing of early integration efforts: the Europeans waited until 1955 to begin
negotiations on a common market rather than embarking on the process in 1948, when
the Soviet threat was at its peak. This criticism misses the important fact that integra-
tion began in 1950 with the creation of the ECSC. Because coal and steel were key deter-
minants of military power, the timing makes a great deal of sense from a balance of
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power perspective. Moreover, the historical record indicates that the Europeans began
to consider economic integration in sectors other than coal and steel in the late 1940s,
not the mid-1950s.3 Finally, Sheetz and Haine are wrong to argue that the Soviet threat
was at its peak in the late 1940s and declined thereafter: the Soviet Union had a greater
power advantage over Western Europe in 1955 than it did in 1948 when it was still re-
covering from the damaging effects of World War II (p. 55).
The form that integration took in the 1950s also puzzles Sheetz and Haine. If the
Europeans faced a signiªcant security threat and had to balance against the Soviet
Union, why did they not integrate their militaries? Although I address the question at
some length in my article, this is a crucial issue and it is worth restating my original
argument. As my theory predicts, the Europeans considered military integration in
the early 1950s and went so far as to sign the European Defense Community (EDC)
treaty, which, had it gone into effect, would have established an integrated European
military. The problem with this arrangement was that France would have had to sur-
render military sovereignty, something it was loath to do. Therefore, the French refused
to ratify the EDC treaty and instead endorsed the preexisting North Atlantic Treaty
Organization (NATO), an arrangement that did not require them to give up sovereignty
and had the added beneªt of keeping the United States in Europe to help contain the
Soviet Union. This is not to say that France was entirely comfortable with the NATO
option; there was a real fear that the United States might one day withdraw from the
continent, at which point the Europeans would have to fend for themselves. Therefore,
the French proposed the Western European Union, a purely European organization that
could quickly be converted into an integrated military force capable of containing the
Soviet Union, in the event of a U.S. withdrawal. Until the United States actually pulled
out, however, France would retain its military sovereignty and continue to cooperate
with the other Western powers within the NATO framework (pp. 62–65).
Norrin Ripsman agrees with me that power political factors largely explain the ori-
gins of European integration, but he questions the link between Soviet power and the
maintenance of the EC from 1960 to 1990. As he puts it, “[T]he Soviet threat to Western
Europe declined considerably after the mid-1950s, yet European cooperation intensi-
ªed, with security cooperation engendering economic cooperation and eventually
broader political integration.” On close inspection, however, it is clear that the Soviet
threat did not decline during this period. With regard to military and economic power,
the Soviet Union held a roughly two to one advantage over the Six throughout the Cold
War (p. 55). Ripsman claims that my power measure is too crude because it focuses
only on European capabilities and ignores the contribution of the United States.
The key point, however, is that the Europeans worried that the United States might
abandon Europe, thereby forcing them to deal with the Soviet Union on their own
(pp. 65–66). Thus, the EC–Soviet Union power comparison is appropriate if scholars
want to understand how the Europeans viewed the Soviet threat.
Moreover, contrary to Ripsman’s assertions, the Europeans made no serious moves
toward political or military integration during this period. Indeed, the 1961 Fouchet
Plan and what came to be called “European political cooperation” were not even seri-
ous attempts at cooperation. As for economic affairs, several commentators have noted
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that the Single European Act and the European Monetary System constituted an evolu-
tion rather than a transformation of the EC system (pp. 66–67).
Moving to more recent history, all of my critics suggest that the European balance of
power cannot account for the events of the past two decades. Speciªcally, the Soviet
Union collapsed, but the EC “reached new heights” with the creation of a monetary
union and a common security and defense policy. If this is true, Soviet power cannot be
regarded as the key driver of the European integration project after 1990. I hope my
views on this issue are clear by now, but in case they are not, I brieºy restate them.
Turning ªrst to the military realm, there has clearly been a considerable amount of
activity in Europe since 1991, but experts agree that the major initiatives—the
Maastricht treaty and the European Security and Defense Policy—are examples of co-
operation, not integration. In other words, since the collapse of the Soviet Union, the
Europeans have done what my theory maintains states do in the absence of an existen-
tial threat: they have cooperated, but they have not integrated (pp. 70–72).
Developments in the economic realm since 1991 can also be understood within the
context of the balance of power. The crucial point is that the collapse of the Soviet
Union removed the core rationale for maintaining the EC. This does not mean that it
gave the Europeans a reason to dismantle the Community—only that it removed their
incentive to preserve it. Once this point is established, the EC’s recent history can be
easily explained. Plans for monetary union, as Krotz and Maher acknowledge, “date
back at least to the 1980s.” The Europeans followed through on their plans despite the
demise of the Soviet Union for several reasons. One obvious reason is that the Soviet
Union did not break up until 1991 and Russian forces were not fully withdrawn from
Germany until 1994. So the change in the balance of power occasioned by the end of the
Cold War was not immediately apparent. It is also worth noting that structural changes
rarely have an immediate impact. The most important reason that the Europeans kept
moving toward monetary union in the 1990s, however, was that these were years of
great prosperity. Thus they may not have had a strategic rationale for preserving the
Community, but they also had no incentive to kill it. As soon as the goose stopped lay-
ing golden eggs at the turn of the millennium, however, the EC started to fray. For ex-
ample, France and Germany began routinely violating the rules underpinning the
single market and the single currency in 2000, and they have increasingly thought and
acted in national rather than community terms (pp. 72–77).
Finally, Ripsman claims that it is hard to square the situation in Europe today with
my balance of power argument. The Soviet Union is no more, but cooperation contin-
ues: “Europe still remains closer to . . . a ‘pluralistic security community’ rather than a
region of competition and war.” This obscures my point. I do not suggest at any point
that Europe has become a war-prone region. My claim is simply that the collapse of the
Soviet Union has led to “the fraying of the economic community.” Indeed, my predic-
tion “is not . . . that the Europeans will stop cooperating with one another,” but that the
“slow fraying of the Community . . . will probably continue” (pp. 72, 86).
alternative arguments
My critics claim that there are better explanations for European integration than mine.
The ªrst alternative holds that integration was designed to balance against Germany,
not the Soviet Union. The second asserts that the creation of the EC can be explained as
a function of great power management rather than balance of power politics. The third
focuses on the maintenance of the EC between 1960 and 1990 and claims that it is best
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understood as a consequence of societal changes in the major European states, which
were in turn the product of democratization and the creation of European institutions.
Although their arguments are not identical, all of my critics agree that European inte-
gration was mainly a French attempt to balance German power. The argument is made
most forcefully by Sheetz and Haine, who argue that the “intra-European balance of
power dynamic offers a much better tool to explain the rise of the EEC, the attempt to
contain German power at Maastricht, and the current crisis of the eurozone.” Else-
where they employ relative gains rhetoric to make the same argument: “The relative
gains issue was a crucial dimension of the European integration process during and af-
ter the Cold War. In other words, the internal balance of power dynamics is crucially
missing in Rosato’s account of European integration.” Such considerations, they argue,
drove the French decision to establish the ECSC and embrace the Maastricht treaty.
There are good reasons to doubt the claim that France proposed the ECSC primarily
to balance against Germany. If the overriding French goal was to contain Germany
in the immediate postwar period, there were other options available—including a puni-
tive treaty or multinational control of Germany’s industrial heartland—that would not
have required France to cooperate with Germany let alone integrate and surrender its
sovereignty. The ECSC must therefore have originated elsewhere, and in my article, I
show that it is clear from the available evidence that Soviet power was the prime deter-
minant of French decisionmaking.4 This is not to say the German threat was irrelevant.
Each time the French chose to integrate, they worked hard to ensure that Paris and
Bonn would have an equal say in the management of the Community in the belief that
this would enable them to establish and maintain a roughly even balance of power be-
tween them and their erstwhile rival. In short, the German threat had a profound im-
pact on the shape of the agreement—itself an important issue—but it did not cause the
French to choose integration in the ªrst place (p. 60, n. 51).5
It is also hard to make the argument that the Maastricht treaty was part of a plan to
contain Germany. Most observers maintain that the decision to “relaunch” integration
was taken during the Cold War when the Soviet Union still presented a formidable
threat and well before German reuniªcation upset the intra-European balance of power.
Krotz and Maher tacitly acknowledge the point, declaring that German reuniªcation
merely “accelerated adoption of EMU [Economic and Monetary Union].”
There are other problems with the intra-European balance of power argument.
Logically, it cannot explain why France would opt for integration in some cases but not
others. If integration was an effective tool “to contain German power,” then why did
the French reject the EDC? Sheetz and Haine could argue that the EDC was different
from other integration agreements because it was the only one that involved military
affairs, but they describe themselves as realists, and the realist position is that fears of
relative gains are just as acute in the economic as they are in the military sphere, mainly
because economic might is the basis of military might.6 Empirically, Sheetz and Haine
claim that concerns about relative gains led France to oppose postwar German recon-
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struction, reject German entry into NATO in 1950, build an atomic bomb in 1954, and
reject a nuclear-armed Germany from day one. They may be right, but this is beside the
point because none of these examples involve integration.
McCourt and Glencross argue that British, French, and German actions in the ªrst
two decades of the Cold War were driven not by balancing alone, as I argue, but by a
desire to “manage the international system—as great powers do.” This is a description
rather than an explanation of the origins of integration because every conceivable be-
havior appears to fall under the rubric of great power management. Even more damag-
ing for their argument, Britain, France, and Germany were not great powers, and they
did not manage international politics in any meaningful way during the period in ques-
tion. The United States and the Soviet Union dominated global politics at the time. In-
deed, McCourt and Glencross provide good evidence of this when they describe a
subservient Britain seeking U.S. military and ªnancial assistance and a weakened
France desperate to reassert its great power status.
Ripsman broadly agrees with my analysis of the origins of integration but offers a
different take on the maintenance of the Community, claiming that liberal factors such
as democratization and institutionalization “brought European societies on board”
with the European project, which in turn engendered greater cooperation and, ulti-
mately, “political integration.” Ripsman’s claim that “[c]ooperation . . . [became] more
ªrmly grounded at the societal level” in the latter part of the Cold War is consistent
with my argument. I agree that once institutions have been created for balance of
power reasons, other factors help to account for their evolution. We part ways, how-
ever, over his claim that liberal factors pushed the Europeans from mere cooperation to
political integration between 1960 and 1990, thereby transforming the EC. The reason
for our disagreement is simple: Europe did not move toward political integration dur-
ing that time. My theory can explain this: as long as there are no changes in the balance
of power—as was the case between 1960 and 1990—revolutionary institutional devel-
opments are unlikely (pp. 65–68).
predictions
My critics claim that my predictions about the future of the European project are either
too optimistic or too pessimistic. Our differences, however, are more apparent than real.
It is not clear to me why Krotz and Maher dispute my analysis of Europe’s future. I
argue that the absence of a major league adversary akin to the Soviet Union means that
the Europeans no longer have a reason to preserve their economic community. To be
clear, this does not mean that they will seek to disband it; only that they will not be
committed to maintaining it if it runs into trouble. In essence, this means that the EC’s
future depends on the health of the European economy. If the economic situation im-
proves, the EC will muddle along. If the economic situation does not improve—and I
argue that there are good reasons to think this is the most likely scenario—the Commu-
nity will continue to fray, perhaps to the point where it becomes a community in name
only (pp. 83–85). Krotz and Maher appear to share my pessimism when they declare
that “Europe’s problems are . . . more numerous, complex, and severe” than even I sug-
gest. Their secondary criticism is that the collapse of the Soviet Union “explains little or
nothing of the EU’s current calamities.” This claim does not contradict my argument, as
I do not draw a direct causal link between the demise of the Soviet Union and the cur-
rent crisis.
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McCourt and Glencross and Sheetz and Haine have a more positive outlook. The fu-
ture is not as grim as I say because the European Union (EU) can provide a vehicle for
its members to exert an inºuence in global politics and, perhaps, to manage the interna-
tional system for their beneªt. What matters according to McCourt and Glencross is
“how much consensus there is between them on using the EU for great power manage-
ment, and hence what kinds of concrete beneªts they think they can derive from it.”
Sheetz and Haine are less explicit but effectively make the same argument: “EU states
are no longer great powers individually, but together they may be able to act like one.”
My critics are right, but this kind of activity is best described as cooperation, not inte-
gration. Consensus decisionmaking, cost-beneªt calculations, and acting together when
interests coincide are the hallmarks of cooperation; they are not what the members of a
supranational community do. What my critics are saying, then, is that the Europeans
are likely to cooperate in the same way as any other group of like-minded states. In that
case, there will be nothing distinctive about the European project, as has been the case
over the past six decades, when there was real integration. Indeed, this is precisely my
point: “This is not to say that the Europeans will stop cooperating with one another. . . .
[T]here are plenty of reasons for them to continue working together. The current distri-
bution of power, however, means that it is unlikely the EC will continue to survive in its
current form. As time passes, it is likely to look more like other international institu-
tions and less like the exceptional case that it seemed to be for so long” (p. 86).
—Sebastian Rosato
Notre Dame, Indiana
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